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iven the difficulties
encountered by the state
of California in deregulat-
ing their electric power
industry, many people are
questioning the wisdom of such a
move. To better understand the moti-
vation behind deregulation, we need to
look at the cost of energy nationwide
in the United States. For example, con-
sider some of the regional energy costs
from August 2001:
Consumers in Texas were paying
$41.50 per MWhour whereas power in
Arizona was going for a high of $49.50
per MWhour. On the same day,
Chicagoans were purchasing their
power for a mere $28.00 per MWhour
<www.enerfax.com, 27 August 2001>. 
The difference in energy costs from one
region to another is what is fueling the move
towards deregulation. Consumers want
access to the cheapest energy sources wher-
ever they are located.
Traditionally, electricity customers
have been a captive market: customers
had to purchase power from their
regional utility at its set rate. In
return, the regional utili-
ty had an obligation to
serve those customers














areas that relied on natural gas or coal
generation frequently paid two to three
times the hydroelectric rate. Utilities
tended to be conservative and took few
risks that might endanger their ability to
serve their customers. New products
and system expansions were planned
years in advance. This approach to busi-
ness led to a very reliable, but some-
what costly, supply of electricity. 
After many of the major industries,
such as banking, shipping and long-dis-
tance telephone, started to deregulate, it
was only a matter of time before atten-
tion turned to electricity. Electric power
utilities have often been considered a
natural monopoly. Unlike long-distance
carriers that can use individual micro-
wave towers or satellites, it is extremely
costly to have more than one set of
transmission lines. Because electricity
serves “the greater good,” utilities had
long acted as benevolent monopolies
under the watchful eye of public utili-
ties commissions. 
This arrangement worked very well
for many years during the explosive
expansion after WWII when fuel was
cheap and reliability was the biggest
problem. However, in the 1970s when
fuel prices started showing signs of
volatility, the public’s eye turned
towards ways of producing cheaper
electricity. In 1978, the Public Utilities
Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA) was
passed. It promoted, among other
things, energy conservation and alter-
nate energy. This allowed non-utility
generators (NUGS) access to the trans-
mission system. This act also required
utility companies to purchase power
from the non-utility generators at mar-
ginal cost. 
PURPA was followed by the 1992
Energy Policy Act (EPA92) that promoted
energy efficiency, the use of alternate fuels,
and provided broader access to the existing
transmission system. Then in 1996, the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) issued a series of policy changes
that created the opening to deregulate. These
new policies required utilities to separate the
transmission of electricity from the business
of generation. The intent of this move was to
encourage transmission providers to “shop
around” for the cheapest electricity and,
thus, to initiate competition and technologi-
cal innovation among utilities.
Unfortunately, the process of deregulation
has not always been a smooth path for a
variety of reasons.
Unlike many commodities such as
gas, electricity cannot be easily stored—
it must be produced at the moment of
need. Not only must the ability to gen-
erate the electricity exist, the ability to
transmit it from the point of generation
to the consumption point must also
exist. Although cheap generation
resources may exist, if the electric
power cannot be transmitted to the
demand site, the customer does not ben-
efit from the lower prices. Or conversely,
since power cannot be stored, unscrupu-
lous suppliers can hold back power, lead-
ing to highly variable “spot pricing” dur-
ing times of high load. Therefore, electric
power deregulation is a two-sided issue:
it concerns both the generation and the
transmission of electricity. 
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One problem that unbundling trans-
mission and generation has produced is
the increased overload of certain trans-
mission corridors. Like highways during
rush hour, transmission lines are also
susceptible to congestion and overload. 
Before deregulation, when genera-
tion and transmission were jointly con-
trolled, generation was decreased at one
site and increased at another to load
alternate transmission paths. This
relieved the congestion. 
Nowadays, however, the electricity
suppliers do not always cooperate with
transmission providers to balance the
power flow across the system. Contracts
between supplies and customers typi-
cally specify a single contract path
along which the contracted amount of
power will flow. The transmission
provider—along which the contract
path occurs—approves this path. 
In reality, however, power flows
across the path of least impedance. The
power may actually flow over a collec-
tion of parallel paths to its destination.
This can cause overloads on transmis-
sion lines covering large geographic
areas. These overloads are very difficult
to predict and control. 
Systems that suffer from severe con-
gestion are said to be transmission limit-
ed and are susceptible to cascading fail-
ures. On the other hand, systems that do
not have sufficient generation are said
to be generation limited. This is partial-
ly the cause of the difficulties encoun-
tered by the state of California in 1999
and 2000.
California was one of the first states
to fully embark on a deregulated elec-
tricity market. The state government
took a very assertive stance. To encour-
age competition and the emergence of
new generation suppliers, the California
State’s legislature forced the existing
California utilities to sell off their gener-
ation assets. The Legislature’s intent
was to force the utilities to purchase
their power on the spot market so that, in
theory, they would always be able to get
the best deal and the cheapest power. 
No long-term contracts were permit-
ted because the California Public
Utilities Commission feared that con-
sumers would be hurt if the prices
dropped in a year or two. Unfortunately,
the daily power purchases subjected
utilities to the volatility of the market-
place. The “last minute” market gave
power producers an incentive to with-
hold power, creating a buying frenzy,
and prices rocketed upward. 
As a result, California consumers
paid $10.9 billion dollars more for elec-
tricity in 2000 than in the previous year.
Further aggravating this situation
was legislation requiring that utilities
use available state-based alternate ener-
gy, or “green power,” often at much
higher prices than traditionally produced
power. Southern California Edison has
paid $25 billion more for electricity
under alternative energy contracts over
the lifetime of this legislation.
But perhaps the fatal nail in the cof-
fin was the rate cap placed by the legis-
lators on the amount utilities could
charge. Immediately prior to the enact-
ment of the deregulation legislation, the
California legislature rolled the price of
electricity for the state’s consumers
back by 10% and froze it. Almost imme-
diately, the price of natural gas and oil
rose as a result of shortages. This move
lead to increased wholesale electricity
prices. But because of the price roll
backs, utilities couldn’t increase what
they charged consumers high enough to
recoup their expenditures. So both the
consumers and the utilities suffered. As
a result, the two largest California utili-
ties, PG&E and Southern Cal Edison,
are in the hole by $9.5 billion worth of
power that they pur-







takes? While no one
has all of the answers,
there are a few guide-
lines that appear to
make sense. Firstly,
long-term contracts
must be allowed to
reduce unscrupulous
price gouging on the
spot market. In New
England, at least 80%
of the electricity
bought and sold is
arranged for in
advance. The remain-
ing 20% is purchased
on the spot market.
This minimizes the
risk to the consumer,
but also allows the
utilities to take advan-
tage of lower prices
when possible.
Secondly, utilities
must be allowed to purchase power
from the cheapest sources, and then
pass those savings on to their cus-
tomers. Conversely, if the price of elec-
tricity increases, that cost increase must
also be passed on to consumers. In
short, the state of California did not
allow the principles of supply and
demand to take hold. Deregulation has
the potential to bring savings to con-
sumers nationwide—if allowed to
progress unfettered by legislative
restrictions.
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